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Abstract 
 
Does decentralisation promote clientelism? If so, through which 
mechanisms? We answer these questions through an analysis of India’s 
(and the world’s) largest workfare programme, the Mahatma Gandhi 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), in two Indian 
states: Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh (AP). The two states adopted 
radically different implementation models: Rajasthan’s decentralised one 
stands in contrast with Andhra Pradesh’s centralised and bureaucracy-led 
model. Using a mixed method approach, we find that in both states local 
implementers have incentives to distribute MGNREGA work in a 
clientelistic fashion. However, in Rajasthan, these incentives are stronger, 
because of the decentralised implementation model. Accordingly, our 
quantitative evidence shows that clientelism is more serious a problem in 
Rajasthan than in AP. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Does democratic decentralisation promote clientelism? If so, through which 
mechanisms? We answer these questions through a qualitative and quantitative analysis 
of the world’s largest workfare programme, India’s Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), in two Indian states, Andhra Pradesh (AP)1 and 
Rajasthan. These have adopted radically different implementation models: while the 
latter devolved implementation to elected village councils (the gram panchayats, or 
GPs), the former implemented the programme through the state bureaucracy. Which 
model is more effective at reducing clientelism? Is AP’s ‘depoliticised’ implementation 
less prone to be captured by local elites? 
We find that some degree of clientelism in the allocation of MGNREGA work is present 
in both states. However, clientelism is significantly less pronounced in AP’s centralised 
setting. This is explained by the different set of incentives generated by the different 
institutional models: in AP, local implementers have stronger incentives to maximise the 
generation of MGNREGA employment, which in turn incentivises them to distribute work 
more broadly, going beyond their circle of supporters, relatives and friends. In 
Rajasthan’s decentralised model, these incentives are missing and local implementers 
distribute work ‘politically’. 
This paper contributes to three domains. First, we add to the literature on 
decentralisation and governance, which has ‘largely ignored’ the effects of the former on 
the latter (Faguet 2014, p. 10). This is rather ironic, considering that one of the main 
objectives of the decentralisation wave of the 1980s and 1990s was precisely to promote 
good governance (Widmalm 2008; Manor, 1999, WDR, 2004). As clientelism has several 
negative consequences on governance (Mansuri and Rao 2013; Stokes, Dunning, 
Nazareno & Brusco 2013; WDR 2017, p. 11; Weitz-Shapiro 2014), we contribute to this 
                                           
1 In June 2014 the state of AP was bifurcated. The ten northern districts now form the state of Telangana. In this 
paper we refer to the unified state. 
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literature not only by establishing a correlation between decentralised implementation 
and clientelism, but also by looking inside the ‘black box’ (Hedstrom and Ylikoski 2010) 
and explaining the mechanisms through which clientelism finds a more or less prominent 
role in the implementation of the MGNREGA.   
Second, we provide an answer to a seriously under researched question, namely 
whether decentralisation promotes clientelism (Bardhan & Mookherjee 2017). Existing 
studies reached mixed conclusions: some authors concluded that decentralisation does 
reduce the scope for clientelism and capture, at least under certain conditions (Faguet 
and Pöschl 2015; Bardhan et al. 2015), while others found that decentralisation actually 
promotes it (Manor 1999; Sadanandan 2012; Crook 2003). We look at the relation 
between decentralisation and clientelism from a particularly advantageous point of view: 
by comparing two states that are very similar in terms of the factors that the literature 
has associated with clientelism, we can focus on the hypothesised institutional driver of 
clientelism, namely democratic decentralisation. Our paper also adds to the literature on 
variance of clientelistic practices at the subnational level.2 
Third, building on what Fox (1994) refers to as “semiclientelism” and on recent 
scholarship (Hicken, 2011), we argue that clientelism should not be seen as a 
dichotomous category (the absence or presence of it), but rather as a continuous 
variable (from a purely programmatic to a purely clientelistic distribution). This is 
because, as detailed below, clientelism is the result of a complex set of incentives, which 
in turn depend on the institutional set up in which implementation takes place and on 
the broader political and social context. In other words, clientelism is not an exclusive 
relation between a patron and a client that interact in a vacuum, but it depends also on 
other actors’ interests, power and agency. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section details our research design. 
Section 3 describes the functioning of the MGNREGA in our two fieldwork states and 
presents the basic premises on which the paper relies. Section 4 unpacks the different 
                                           
2 Examples of such studies are Weitz-Shapiro 2014 and Heath and Tillin, forthcoming. 
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sets of incentives that MGNREGA local implementers are subjected to in the two states. 
Qualitative evidence is corroborated, in section 5, by a quantitative analysis of the role of 
GP-level implementers in the allocation of MGNREGA work. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Research Design and methodology 
 
The MGNREGA guarantees 100 days of employment per year in public works to 
every rural household. Rajasthan and AP are similar in terms of factors usually 
associated with clientelism such the electoral system (McGillivray 2004), levels of 
poverty and of party competition (Brusco , Nazareno & Stokes 2004; Weitz-Shapiro 
2014; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Sadanandan 2012), the role of the state in the 
economy and the size of the informal sector (Chandra 2004; Bardhan and Mookherjee 
2017), and the design and quality of institutions (Golden 2003; Heath and Tillin, 
forthcoming), as shown by the fact that both states were quite successful at 
implementing the MGNREGA (Table 1)3 
 
[TABLE 1 AROUND HERE] 
 
The two states, however, adopted radically different models of implementation. In 
Rajasthan, the key implementer at the local level is the sarpanch, who is the head of the 
elected council (GP) and is therefore accountable to the beneficiaries who form a 
sizeable part of the electorate. In AP, the GPs are excluded from playing any meaningful 
role in the MGNREGA and the key decision-maker is an employee of the state 
government, the Field Assistant (FA), who is accountable to the higher echelons of the 
state administration (Maiorano, 2014; Veeraraghavan 2015, p. 25 and p. 34; Jenkins 
                                           
3At least as far as the implementation of the MGNREGA is concerned. In line with other scholars, we take the 
average number of persondays per household as a key indicator of success (Chopra 2015). 
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and Manor 2017, p. 255).4 This was a conscious choice of the state administration. The 
architects of the MGNREGA in AP shared an “ambedkarite” view of the GPs.5 One of the 
top officials in the Rural Development Department of AP told us: 
We decided not to involve the GPs because 95 per cent of them are 
dominated by the upper castes and they rule according to feudal rules. We 
thought that nothing good for the poor could come out of them (interview, 
Hyderabad, 20/12/2012). 
Other officials expressed similar feelings of mistrust: one of them told us that they 
feared that “once you open the gate [of decentralised implementation] you are not able 
to control it” (interview, Hyderabad, 17 December 2012); another very senior official 
stated that the MGNREGA could just “not work” if implemented through the GPs: “they 
don’t even have computers!” (interview, Hyderabad, 15 December 2012).  
In other words, the two states represent a very good exemplification of a major 
debate in development research: Rajasthan’s decentralised and GP-led model stands in 
contrast with AP’s centralised, technocratic and administration-led model. This provides 
an empirical basis to ask, which model is less prone to clientelism and why? 
We used a broad definition of clientelism as an exchange system where state officials 
(elected or appointed) discretionally distribute state resources to citizens in exchange of 
political support. By ‘political support’ we do not intend only voting, but also other forms 
of support that increase the power and status of the official, like favours, services, and 
respect, all very valuable resources in an Indian village. 
We adopt a mixed method approach combining 150 semi-structured interviews with 
survey data collected between October 2013 and January 2014, in six districts (three in 
each state) chosen to maximise intra-state variety.6 In each district, two GPs were 
                                           
4 The MGNREGA Act mandates that at least 50 per cent of the funds are spent through the GPs. AP has 
blatantly violated this provision of the national Act. This was confirmed to us in interviews with Member of 
Legislative Assembly (MLA) Jayaprakash Narayan (Hyderabad 17 December 2012). The Union Minister for 
Rural Development has repeatedly asked the AP government to rectify this (to no avail). See The Hindu (2013). 
5 This refers to the Dalit leader, B. R. Ambedkar, who believed that Indian village councils were a major source 
of oppression by the dominant castes on the Dalit communities. 
6 The districts in AP are Visakhapatnam, Chittoor and Karimnagar; in Rajasthan: Churu, Kaurali and Sirohi. 
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randomly selected within the same sub-district7 and respondents were randomly 
selected among the GP’s MGNREGA beneficiaries.8 
The next section spells out three important premises on which the rest of the 
paper is based. 
 
3. MGNREGA: a post-clientelistic policy? 
 
By conferring the right to obtain employment on demand, the MGNREGA was 
specifically designed as a “post-clientelistic” policy (Manor, 2013; Elliott, 2011) and 
some studies do find very limited distributive distortions (Sheahan et al. 2014; Johnson 
2009). However, numerous studies showed that supply-side issue like administrative 
incapacity and lack of political commitment result in work being ‘rationed’ (Dutta et al. 
2014; Chopra, 2014 and 2015; Jenkins and Manor 2017; Mukherji & Jha, 2014; Ravi & 
Engler, 2009) and that clientelism affects implementation (Das 2015; Khosla 2011; 
Mukhopadhyay, Himanshu, & Sharan, 2015; Marcesse 2018). What these studies do not 
do, however, is explaining why clientelism is present or absent from the implementation 
of the programme. Our paper provides such an explanation through an analysis of the 
mechanisms that shape the distribution of MGNREGA work. 
 
This paper is based on three premises. First, the more MGNREGA work is rationed, 
the more local implementers will have the incentive to distribute it in a clientelistic 
fashion, as scarcity is a key determinant of a distorted distribution (Chubb 1982; Weitz-
Shapiro 2014). Das and Maiorano (2015) find this to be true in the context of MGNREGA. 
From the perspective of a local implementer, a greater availability of MGNREGA work 
makes it less costly to distribute to someone who will not provide (or is less likely to 
provide) political support in return. 
 
                                           
7Sub-district units are referred to as “blocks” in Rajasthan and “mandals” in AP. 
8One GP in Kaurali was excluded from the final dataset due to lower data quality. All respondents had a job 
card and had worked under the scheme in at least one fiscal year since 2008/09. 
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Second, local implementers have the power to determine how scarce MGNREGA work 
is in their GP. It should be noted that there are a number of supply-side factors that 
determine scarcity of MGNREGA work that are beyond the control of local implementers, 
the most important of which is funding from the central (federal) government, that 
provides 90% of the total funds. Figure 1 shows that the central government has 
significantly reduced funding for the programme over the last few years. 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Limited funding is a significant constraint to the generation of MGNREGA 
employment, as it limits the number of worksites that can be opened in any given GP, 
which in turn limits the number of people that can be employed. In principle, the central 
government should provide enough financial resources to cover the theoretical possibility 
that all rural households demand 100 days of employment in any given year. However, 
the central government simply violates this provision of the Act and instead caps 
budgetary allocations. Simply put, if the central government does not allocate enough 
resources, local implementers will not be able to meet the demand for MGNREGA work. 
 
Given the constraints on employment generation determined by central funding and 
other supply-side issues, local implementers can nevertheless determine how scarce (or 
abundant) MGNREGA work actually is in their GP. This is so because they have the 
monopoly of information on all aspects of the programme, including about how many 
and what projects are approved by sub-district level officials. Therefore, the sarpanch in 
Rajasthan and the FA in AP can determine levels of scarcity by controlling the number 
and the type (more or less labour intensive) of worksites that are started in their GP. In 
other words, without their nod, no worksite can start and no one can be employed. In 
the next section we analyse the incentives that local implementers have to generate 
more (or less) employment in their GPs. 
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The third premise is that local implementers have the power to distribute 
MGNREGA work at their discretion, which is a hallmark of clientelism. Our qualitative 
evidence fully supports this, and so does the literature (Marcesse 2018; Dunning & 
Nilekani 2013). In Rajasthan, the sarpanches have a crucial influence on selection of 
beneficiaries (Mukhopadhyay et al., 2015). Our survey shows that 41% of the 
respondents approach the sarpanch to demand work and 66% of them think that he/she 
is the most-important decision-maker within the program. 
A sarpanch reported: 
When a worksite is approved, I approach the people living nearby and I ask if 
they want to work. I hired a person (that I pay from my own pocket) to help them 
fill the “Form 6”9 (Interview, Kaurali district, February 7, 2014). 
A rozgar sevak10 described a similar procedure: 
When the sarpanch tells me that a worksite is ready to be opened, I approach the 
workers that live near the worksite location and ask them if they want to work. If 
they do, I fill in the “Form 6s” and submit them to the block office. (Interview, 
Sirohi, district February 10, 2014). 
In short, work is available only if and when the sarpanch offers it, as they have 
full authority over the list and location of works to be taken up.11 
In AP the institutional set up is very different. The key implementer at the GP 
level is the FA, a contractual employee of the state government, appointed at the GP 
level. However, they are not accountable to the GP, but to the mandal (sub-district) level 
officials. Moreover, as we shall see below, FA are also closely monitored by Members of 
the Legislative Assembly (MLAs). Similarly to the sarpanches in Rajasthan, the FA 
                                           
9 Form 6 is the form that needs to be filled in to demand work. 
10The functionary in charge of the MGNREGA at the village level. 
11 Marcesse (2018) finds the same in UP. 
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controls every aspect of the program including the selection of the beneficiaries and, to a 
lesser extent, the worksite location (interview, state official, Hyderabad, December 6, 
2012). 
One ‘mate’ told us:12 
 
When some works are ready to start, the FA calls me and asks if we are 
interested in that particular type of work. I then ask to my group’s 
members and report to the FA. We are lucky because I am in a good 
relationship with the FA, so he calls me often (interview, Chittoor district, 
October 4, 2013). 
 
In other cases, the FA decided to allocate work on a rotation basis to avoid 
discrimination and protest from the villagers (interview with two FAs, Chittoor and 
Karimnagar districts, October 9 and 31, 2013). In other cases, the start of a worksite is 
announced with drums, so that people interested in working come to the GP office and 
let the FA know (direct observation, Karimnagar district, November 2, 2013). 
In short, despite the difference in institutional settings, the situation strongly 
reminds that of Rajasthan: work is provided only if and when the FA decides so.13 In the 
words of a state official, “if the FA doesn’t want to provide jobs, he doesn’t” (interview, 
Hyderabad, December 19, 2012). Our survey data show that 69.2% of the respondents 
are “offered” work (rather than “demanded”) and 69% indicate that the FA is the most 
important decision-maker in MGNREGA. 
To sum up, the MGNREGA is implemented through quite different institutional set 
ups in the two states. In Rajasthan, the key implementer (the sarpanch) is directly 
accountable to the beneficiaries who form a sizeable part of the electorate, while in AP 
                                           
12In AP all MGNREGA beneficiaries are organised in groups of about 20 members called SSS groups. Each 
group is led by a ‘mate’. The groups’ members get employment as a group, rather than individually. 
13Recently, the Rural Development Department has introduced a standardised procedure for “capturing” the 
demands for work. In most villages across the state, job applications are registered on one given day every 
week, irrespective of the will of the FA. During one field visit to one pilot site by one of us in October 2013, we 
saw that the procedure was duly followed and written receipts were issued. 
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the process is completely in the hands of the state’s administration, which is scarcely 
accountable to the MGNREGA beneficiaries. Despite the different institutional set up, 
however, the process of allocation of MGNREGA jobs is similar in the two states. In both 
cases, it depends on the discretion of one key actor at the GP level. We now look at the 
incentives that local implementers have to generate as much (or as little) MGNREGA 
employment as possible. 
 
4. Political, Economic and administrative incentives 
 
4.1 Political Incentives 
Local implementers’ political incentives for the maximisation of MGNREGA work are 
different in the two states, mainly because of the different institutional set up. The most 
obvious political incentive for providing MGNREGA jobs in (decentralised) Rajasthan is 
the fact that the sarpanch is able to distribute tangible benefits – employment – to the 
poor who, in many cases, form a sizable part of the electorate.14 Assuming that the 
sarpanch’s primary objective is to be re-elected, he/she will have the incentive to use 
the MGNREGA to keep their support base intact and/or to enlarge it. This should 
incentivise them to provide as much work as possible. 
However, budgetary constraints and low administrative capacity seriously 
limit the availability of MGNREGA work, as illustrated above. Furthermore, 
sarpanches know that their prospects of being re-elected are very low, especially 
if their post was reserved for women or other disadvantaged communities15 
(Chattopadhyay & Duflo 2004). Hence, the incentive to maximise the generation 
of MGNREGA work and enlarge the distribution of employment is limited. In this 
situation, we can expect sarpanches  to prioritise their supporters, families and 
relatives, when allocating the available work. This is consistent with our survey 
                                           
14We focus here on village-level political incentives. Other papers (Zimmermann 2015; Johnson 2009; Elliott 
2011) have explored this type of incentives at higher levels. 
15 The post of sarpanch is reserved for women, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Castes 
on a rotation basis.  
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data (see below), with our interviews with the sarpanches of the surveyed GPs, 
and with theory on clientelism according to which politicians tend to target the 
core of their support base when allocating scarce goods and services, especially 
when they have a direct relations with their clients (like the sarpanches have) 
(Cox 2010). This meets the theoretical expectations of Stokes et al. (2013)’s 
‘broker-mediated theory’, according to which the lower one descends in the party 
hierarchy, the higher the incentive to target core (rather than swing) voters. This 
expectation is also backed by studies of the MGNREGA in other states (Das 2015; 
Dey and Sen 2016).16 
In AP, FAs have political incentives too. The FA posts are frequently found to be 
political posts controlled by the local MLA, who in India are able to exert significant 
control over the bureaucracy (Iyer & Mani, 2012). MLAs are usually not interested in who 
gets MGNREGA work, but they are interested in making sure that work is available in 
their constituencies.17 It is not uncommon, for example, for them to exert pressure on 
the state administration (in particular at the district and mandal level) and on the FAs to 
generate enough employment to satisfy people’s demand, but at the same time not to 
hurt the interests of the farming community (see below). Moreover, FAs are fully 
embedded into the GP’s political economy and they could therefore be taking the 
sarpanch’s (or other powerful actor’s) political needs into consideration when allocating 
MGNREGA work. Additionally, FAs have the incentive to be as generous as possible when 
allocating work in order to build up their reputation and increase their status and power. 
In both states, local implementers have a strong counter-incentive to generate 
employment, which is the big farmers’ opposition to the MGNREGA (Jakimow, 2014; 
Veeraraghavan 2015). According to a senior official of the Rural Development 
department of AP, the pressures of the farmers’ lobby to limit the availability of 
MGNREGA work is the “single most important reason why we fail to provide 100 days of 
                                           
16 Chau, Liu & Soundararajan (2018), in contrast to most literature and to our argument, argue that sarpanches 
adopt an expansionist strategy. 
17This came out of interviews with 4 MLAs, two ministers and numerous state government officials. 
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work to whoever demands it” (interview, Hyderabad, 6 August 2013). Landowners claim 
that the scheme has caused an increase in wages (thus making farming unprofitable)18 
and that it has become difficult to find labourers during the agricultural peak season.19 
Moreover, dominant caste landlords resent the fact that the MGNREGA has contributed 
to alter power relations at the village level (Roy, 2014, 2015; Jakimov, 2014; Maiorano, 
Thapar-Björkert & Blomkvist 2016). As one farmer we talked to put it: the MGNREGA ‘is 
part of the system of injustice that the government created against the farmers. It is 
perpetuating the disrespect that we are experiencing from the lower castes (interview, 
Anantpur district, January 2017). 
To sum up, political incentives in both states push in two opposing directions as 
GP-level implementers must reconcile the interests of two opposing constituencies: 
usually powerless workers pushing for more MGNREGA work on the one hand, and 
usually very powerful farmers pushing for less availability of work on the other. This 
limits their incentive to maximize employment. 
 
4.2 Economic Incentives 
A second type of incentive to provide MGNREGA work relates to the possibility by 
local level implementers to extract an illicit fee out of it. This is, of course, an incentive 
per se.  However, in the case of Rajasthan (and of politically ambitious FAs in AP) it is 
also a way to fund their electoral campaigns.  In fact, the increased importance of the 
office since the introduction of the MGNREGA has also brought about increased electoral 
competition and higher electoral expenses.20 
The main way through which local implementers in both states can pocket some 
money is through kickbacks on the purchase of the materials needed for the execution of 
works. This is in fact where the bulk of corruption is to be found (Afridi & Iversen, 2013). 
However, the expenditure on materials cannot exceed 40 per cent of the total in any 
                                           
18 Indeed MGNREGA has been identified as one of the factors contributing towards the upward trend in rural 
wages (Himanshu and Kundu 2016; Imbert and Papp 2015). 
19This came from numerous interviews with farmers in both states.  See also Veeraraghavan 2015. 
20This was confirmed by almost all the sarpanches we spoke to in Rajasthan. 
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given GP. Thus, the more employment a local implementer provides, the higher would be 
the (absolute) expenditure on materials, from which they can extract a fee. 
However, this incentive to maximise MGNREGA employment is limited by the 
strong transparency and accountability measures that the MGNREGA contains. Not only 
are all data related to program implementation – including the flow of funds – available 
online, but the act prescribes that social audits are held regularly in every single GP.  
AP is the only state that has institutionalised social audits and implements them 
regularly through an independent society (Aiyar, Kapoor & Samji, 2009; Akella & 
Kidambi, 2007). Rajasthan, on the other hand, has conducted a number of extremely 
successful social audits through civil society organisations such as the Mazdoor Kisan 
Shakti Sangatan (MKSS); however, in villages that lack a strong network of civil society 
organisations their efficacy is rather limited (Jenkins and Manor, 2017). In any case, as 
one sarpanch puts it, stealing from the MGNREGA “is a lot of work for little reward; and 
with a high probability of being caught” (interview, Churu district, 1 February, 2014). 
Another sarpanch agrees: “why should I try to steal from the MGNREGA when the 
probability of being caught are so high and the money must be shared with a lot of other 
people?” (Interview, Sirohi district 24 February, 2014). This of course does not mean 
that sarpanches renounce to steal from the programme, but it is clear that the incentive 
to maximise employment generation in order to extract an illicit fee is limited by the 
difficulties in doing so. 
The situation in AP is even more difficult for those who want to steal from the 
program, as social audits are regularly conducted in all GPs and they constitute a 
deterrent for FAs and other officials who wish to supplement their salary. As Aiyar and 
Mehta (2015) found, in order to steal from the MGNREGA in AP it is now necessary to 
build large corruption networks which, by involving numerous actors, increase the 
possibility of being caught and diminish the amount of resources that can be pocketed. 
Therefore, the transparency mechanisms in place limit the possibility of extracting 
an illicit fee out of it. The reduction in corruption witnessed in recent years is an 
indication of the efficacy of these measures (Drèze, 2014). This acts in opposition to the 
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incentive to maximise MGNREGA employment described above. Furthermore, it 
reinforces the incentive to provide work according to political considerations, as these 
remain the most tangible benefits for local implementers. 
 
4.3 Administrative incentives 
The third type of incentives for the maximisation of MGNREGA work is of an 
administrative kind. In Rajasthan, these are virtually absent, since the decentralised 
setting chosen for the implementation of the MGNREGA leaves the sarpanches free to set 
their own targets.  
In AP, on the other hand, where the FA is accountable to the state government, 
the latter has the power to impose targets from above. In fact, FAs must generate at 
least 15,000 workdays per year.  If they fail, their contract may be terminated, or their 
salary reduced.  This constitutes an important incentive to maximise MGNREGA 
employment. A FA told us that at times she has to “chase” villagers to work under 
MGNREGA in order to meet the target (interview, Karimnagar district, August 23, 2013). 
In fact, all the FAs we talked to were very concerned about meeting the target. In 
certain cases, this was completely unrealistic given the small size of the GP where the 
FAs worked. In all the GP that we visited, the administrative incentive to provide a fixed 
number of persondays worked as a potent incentive to maximise MGNREGA work, which 
in turn pushed for the broadening of the pool of beneficiaries and hence a reduced scope 
for the allocation of MGNREGA work along strict clientelistic lines. 
 
5. Quantitative Analysis 
 
As we have seen, different institutional settings generate different types of 
incentives in the two states, which have, however, similar effects: political and economic 
incentives to maximise MGNREGA employment are set off by powerful counter-incentives 
to keep MGNREGA employment to a minimum. 
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[TABLE 2 AROUND HERE] 
 
As table 2 summarises, the incentives of GP-level implementers to maximise the 
allocation of MGNREGA employment (subject to scarcity determined by factors beyond 
their control) are stronger in centralized AP than in decentralized Rajasthan. This should 
make MGNREGA work less scarce in AP and therefore less costly to distribute widely and 
not along strict clientelistic lines. In this section, we adopt regression analysis to test this 
hypothesis. 
(a) Variables 
(i) Outcome Variables- getting work, number of days of work and earnings from 
MGNREGA 
We use three main dependent variables for the econometric analysis: whether the 
household got work or not, the number of days of work, and the earnings from 
MGNREGA for the year 2013-14. These data are taken from the official MGNREGA 
website, and associated to the job-card numbers recorded during the survey. We 
categorise getting work as “1” or “0” depending on whether the household got work 
or not, respectively. For number of days of work and earnings, we add 1 and take the 
logarithmic value of both these variables as the dependent variables to generate a 
value of zero for those who did not work.  
(ii) Explanatory Variables 
Our primary variable of interest is local implementers’ political interests in the two 
states. The proxy used for political interests in Rajasthan is a dummy variable which 
takes the value of “1” if the household resides in the same village (within the same 
GP) of the sarpanch and the value of “0” otherwise. Many Indian GPs consist of 
several villages (or habitations). For AP, this dummy variable is taken for the FA 
instead. We also take a dummy for households residing in the village where the FA 
and sarpanch both live. The objective is to test if households residing in the village of 
the sarpanch and FAs get more benefits from the program. Our qualitative evidence 
indicates that this is where the core of the support base of the sarpanches lives. 
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Moreover, proximity to the voters makes it easier for the sarpanches to acquire 
information on who voted for whom. It is also plausible to assume that, for politically 
ambitious FAs, their habitation would be the main source of political support.21 
We include a number of explanatory variables to capture the economic, 
demographic and village level factors. Caste dummies are included as it is a crucial 
indicator of backwardness and social discrimination. Land holdings, household size 
and occupational structure are included as these variables can serve as the major 
indicators of socio-economic condition of a household. Further, distance of the 
household from the GP headquarters is taken as indicator of isolation and seclusion 
from the GP center. Moreover, this variable can control for the fact that AP GPs are 
not as scattered as those in Rajasthan. This can make it very difficult for the FAs to 
discriminate across the households that live in different habitations. 
To control for other occupational opportunities for the household apart from 
MGNREGA, we use the logarithmic value of the reported non-MGNREGA wages 
received when MGNREGA works are implemented. Further, we incorporate political 
party dummies in the regression to control for the party locally in power. For AP, a 
dummy of whether any member of the household or immediate relative is an elected 
representative of the GP is included as one of the explanatory variables in the 
econometric exercise. For Rajasthan, we were not able to include this variable 
because of less variability in the data. In Rajasthan, we have also controlled for 
woman/SC/ST reserved GPs. For AP, however, we have not used this variable as all 
the reserved GPs are ruled by the YSR Congress or the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) 
and hence this variable is already captured by the political variable we incorporated. 
Since caste composition in a habitation can determine demand for MGNREGA works, 
we also control for the proportion of SC or ST in the habitation where the household 
resides. Finally, we control for meteorological conditions, as a lack of rainfall can 
determine a surge in demand for MGNREGA work. We thus include district-wise 
                                           
21 Mukhopadhyay et al. (2015) and Dey and Sen (2016) adopt the same criterion to 
analyse distributive strategies of the sarpanches. 
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rainfall data for 2012 (proportion of monsoon months from June to September, when 
deficit rainfall was experienced as against the long-term average in that month) as a 
demand-side control variable. 
(b) Regression Strategy 
The first objective of the econometric exercise is to explore if households residing 
in the habitation where the sarpanch/FAs reside have higher probability of getting 
work under MGNREGA. Since getting work is a dichotomous variable, we apply logit 
regression to estimate the determinants of a household working under MGNREGA in 
2013-14. The second and third objectives are to find if these households work for 
higher number of days under MGNREGA and earn more in comparison to others. 
Number of days of work or earnings is censored from below since a substantial 
proportion of the households did not work and hence the variables would show a 
value of zero for these households. Since simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimates might yield biased estimates, we apply tobit regression (Long, 1997).  
(c) Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 gives an indication of how MGNREGA has been implemented in the survey 
areas. It is found that 41% of the sample households in Rajasthan worked in 
MGNREGA in 2013-14. These households worked for 37.5 days and earned Rs. 
4027.5 on average from the program. About 57% of these households are found to 
reside in the habitation where the GP sarpanch resides. For AP, 48 % of the sampled 
households worked under MGNREGA in 2013-14 for 61.5 days on average and 
earned Rs. 8268.5. 60% of the sampled households stay in habitations where the FA 
resides and 85% of these households also stay in the habitations where the sarpanch 
lives. 
 (d) Results 
Table 4 shows the regression results for Rajasthan, which contains the estimates 
for the probability of getting work under MGNREGA in 2013-14 as well as that for the 
number of days of work and earnings. The first column gives the odds-ratio. An 
odds-ratio greater than 1 indicates a positive relationship, which implies a greater 
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chance of achieving the outcome for a particular group in comparison to the 
reference group. An odds-ratio lower than 1 indicates a negative relationship. We 
find that households residing in the same habitation of the sarpanch have 
significantly higher chances of working under the program and also earning more. 
This indicates that MGNREGA can be seen as an instrument for the sarpanch to get 
political leverage by allocating the benefits of the program proportionately more to 
the households, which live in close proximity of him/her. Mukhopadhyay et al. (2015) 
show similar findings in Rajasthan.  
Table 5 shows the estimates from the regression for AP. Analogous to the results 
from the estimates for Rajasthan, we find households residing in habitations of the 
FAs work significantly more in terms of the number of days and earnings from the 
program, though no significant relationship is found in terms of probability of getting 
work. Interestingly, the findings are true for household residing in habitations where 
both FA and sarpanch live. This probably hints at the fact that in AP, the discretion of 
choosing households and selective rationing comes through the FAs and partially 
through sarpanches as well. Of note is the fact that these findings are independent of 
the socio-economic characteristics of the households, which have been controlled for 
in the regression.  
The empirical results show similar findings as observed from the qualitative 
narratives discussed in the paper. As indicated, implementation of MGNREGA in 
Rajasthan comes through the sarpanches, whose incentives to maximise MGNREGA 
employment are rather weak and they will therefore be inclined to distribute work in 
a clientelist fashion. We find that they choose to give priority to their own supporters. 
In fact, we find households residing in the same village of the sarpanch to get higher 
benefits out of MGNREGA. In AP, where the implementation responsibilities are in the 
hands of the FAs we find that, unlike in Rajasthan, households who live in the village 
where the FA resides do not have higher probability of getting work compared to 
others. However, the FAs tend to prioritise their supporters in terms of allocating a 
higher number of workdays to these households compared to other who got work, 
 19 
but unlike in Rajasthan, these individuals do not have higher probability of getting at 
least some work. 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper analysed the set of incentives that shapes the implementation of the 
MGNREGA as a result of two different implementation models: in Rajasthan, the 
implementation is in the hands of an elected official who is accountable to the 
programme’s beneficiaries, whereas in AP the key field implementer is a bureaucrat 
accountable to the state administration. 
Based on a combination of quantitative and qualitative analyses, we find that in the 
centralized setting (AP), clientelism plays a comparatively less prominent role: MGNREGA 
work is distributed to those who demands it, although the amount of work allocated 
varies according to political considerations. In the decentralized setting (Rajasthan), both 
the allocation of work and the amount of work allocated are distributed in a clientelistic 
fashion. 
The key mechanism that explains these findings relates with the incentives that field 
implementers have to maximize the generation of MGNREGA employment: the more work 
is available to be distributed, the more local implementers will enlarge the pool of 
beneficiaries. The political and economic incentives to maximise the availability of 
MGNREGA work are similar in the two states and are weaker than it might be assumed: 
what is crucial is that in the centralized setting, field implementers respond to incentives 
to maximise MGNREGA employment that are imposed from above, which in turn results in 
a fairer distribution of work. 
Our findings have three main implications. First, along with some well-established 
predictors of clientelism like poverty and party competition, the institutional set up 
matters greatly. In the two cases analysed in this paper, it is the centralised setting 
chosen for the implementation of the MGNREGA that allows for specific policy correctives 
– like the administrative incentives that we discussed – to be introduced and put in 
operation.  
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Secondly, clientelism cannot be treated as a dichotomous variable. The ground reality 
is more complex and the empirical evidence that we present suggests that clientelism 
should rather be understood as a continuous variable. In our analysis, the distribution of 
MGNREGA work is clientelistic in both states, but much less so in AP. This is not only an 
analytical distinction: less clientelism in AP means that households are not excluded from 
the programme for political reasons, which makes a big difference on the ground. 
Furthermore, we show that clientelism is seldom if ever an exclusive relationship 
between a client and a patron that occurs in a vacuum. Instead, both actors are 
embedded into a net of social and political relations that inevitably affect and shape their 
own (clientelistic) relationship. The fact that MGNREGA implementers take into 
consideration the interests of the big farmers when distributing jobs is a clear example of 
how a clientelistic relationship is affected by the broader political and social context. 
Finally, our analysis shows that democratic decentralisation facilitates clientelism, but 
also that bureaucracy-led implementation does not completely eliminate it. Moreover, 
top-down implementation is inherently fragile: the existence of administrative incentives 
that limit clientelism in AP is crucially dependent on state officials at higher levels who are 
committed to enforce the respect of targets. A few administrative transfers could change 
the situation radically, altering local implementers’ incentives and their effects on 
clientelistic practice. 
As a final normative remark, the findings presented here support the argument that 
policymakers should pay much more attention to the political context in which policies are 
implemented. In order to ensure a fair distribution of MGNREGA work and ensure its 
demand-driven nature, local implementers should be incentivised to generate as much 
employment as possible. While a key policy correction in this regard is to guarantee 
enough financial resources, the political context still matters greatly. For instance, 
establishing a dialogue with farmers’ associations in order to ensure continuity in the 
availability of MGNREGA jobs throughout the year could make a big difference in terms of 
ensuring that the gap between demand and supply of work is minimised, which is a key 
indicator of the success of the policy (Gaiha, Kulkarni, Pandey, & Imai 2010). Similarly, 
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offering rewards to highly performing GPs offers sarpanches incentives to guarantee the 
right to work, ultimately translating the rights-based nature of the MGNREGA into reality. 
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Figures and tables 
Table 1. Employment generation in India, Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan 2008/09-
2014/15. 
 2008
/09 
2009/
10 
2010/
11 
2011/
12 
2012/
13 
2013/
14 
2014/
15 
2015/
16 
Average 
08/09-
15/16 
AP 47,99 65,67 54,05 56,49 55,69 49,60 41,82 46,68 52,25 
Rajasthan 75,78 68,97 51,64 46,60 51,90 50,85 43,95 48,57 54,78 
All India 47,95 53,99 46,79 42,43 44,99 45,86 37,74 41,95 45,21 
Source: Official MGNREGA data. 
 
Figure 1. MGNREGA Nominal and Real Expenditure 2008-16.Figures are in Indian rupees 
(Rs.) crores. One crore corresponds to 10 million. 
 
Source: Budget documents (Revised Estimates except for 2015/16) and authors’ 
calculations based on the Commodity Price Index. 
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Table 2 – Impact of the incentives to generate MGNREGA employment 
 Political 
Incentives 
Economic 
Incentives 
Administrative 
Incentives 
AP Limited  Limited  Strong  
Rajasthan Limited  Limited  No  
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Table 3: Indicators of MGNREGA implementation in 2013-14 among sampled households 
in Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan 
 Rajasthan Andhra Pradesh 
Got work (proportion) 0.41 0.48 
Number of days of work (mean) 37.51 61.47 
MGNREGA earnings (Rs.) (mean) 4027.51 8268.47 
Source: Author’s calculation based on field survey as discussed. 
 
Table 4.Regression results for Rajasthan 
 Logit (Getting 
work) 
Tobit (Log of 
days 
worked+1) 
Tobit (Log of 
wages 
earned+1 
Ref. Households not residing in 
sarpanch habitations 
   
Households residing in sarpanch 
habitation 
2.500*** 1.037** 2.360** 
 (0.81) (0.44) (0.98) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
GP fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 482 482 482 
R2 0.29 0.15 0.12 
 
Robust standard errors are put in parenthesis. The first column gives the odds-ratio from the logit regression 
and the second and third column gives the co-efficient estimates from the tobit regressions. Controls used are 
household size, caste dummies, land holdings, distance of the household from GP headquarters, occupation 
dummy, non-MGNREGA wage, GP reservation dummy for woman/SC/ST, proportion of SC/ST in the habitation 
and number of monsoon months that experienced deficit rainfall in 2012 as against long term average. The full 
regression table can be provided on request. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, p<0.5. 
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Table 5.Regression results for Andhra Pradesh 
 Probit (Getting 
work) 
Tobit (Log of days 
worked+1) 
Tobit (Log of 
wages 
earned+1 
Ref. Households not 
residing in FA’s habitation 
      
Households residing in FA’s 
habitation 
1.336  0.332***  0.948***  
 (0.55)  (0.09)  (0.19)  
Ref. Households not 
residing where both FA and 
sarpanch lives 
      
Households residing where 
both FA and sarpanch lives 
 2.288*  1.051***  2.477*** 
  (1.03)  (0.09)  (0.21) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
GP fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 618 618 618 618 618 618 
R2 0.23 0.23 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.09 
Robust standard errors are put in parenthesis. The first two columns give the odds-ratio and the last four 
columns give the co-efficient estimates. Controls used are household size, caste dummies, possession of BPL 
card, land holdings, distance of the household from GP headquarters, occupation dummy, non-MGNREGA 
wage, GP reservation dummy for woman/SC/ST, party locally in power, proportion of SC/ST in the habitation 
and number of monsoon months that experienced deficit rainfall in 2012 as against long term average. Due to 
paucity of space, we do not present the results for controls. It can be provided on request. The full regression 
table can be provided on request. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, p<0.5. 
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